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Abstract
Institutional theories emphasize the important roles played by the state, political actors, and beliefs
for the formation of viable markets.  The introduction of mass privatization policies in Russia and the
Czech Republic depended on the creation of impersonal capital markets to finance the needs of pri-
vatized companies and to provide a secondary market for the trading of securities.  However, a com-
parative case analysis of post-privatization market formation in both these countries demonstrates that
the functional necessity for these markets does not engender their own creation.  In the absence of
institutional mechanisms of state regulation and trust, markets become arenas for political contests
and economic manipulation.  The irony of these policies is that a principal lesson has been that mar-
ket reforms cannot create viable markets, only institutional formation can.
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The decisions to privatize Russian and Czech industry in the period from 1992 to 1994 con-
stitute a unique experiment for the understanding of the relationship of markets, organizations and
institutions.  These policies of mass privatization were predicated on the presumption that private en-
terprises would be subject to superior governance properties due to interested external shareholders
with access to capital markets.  These capital markets provide not only information through price
movements, standardized reports, and investment research, but they also allow investors to exit as
owners from companies they regard as unattractive.
Capital markets arose spontaneously following mass privatization in both countries.  In Rus-
sia, 56 stock markets received government licenses by the end of 1995, one year following the end of
the privatization program (Goskomstat, 1996).  Moreover, international aid and advisers sought to
foster capital market development through the provision of the technologies for institution creation,
e.g. the principles of registration and deposit of securities.  Though the Czech Republic took a more
independent route, the financial markets of western countries acted as powerful cognitive templates
for the design of similar markets.
By 1998, the economies of Russia and the Czech Republic have seriously underperformed
those of comparable countries.  Figure 1 presents economic data for five countries.  Due to their his-
torical and economic similarities, the two countries of particular relevance are Poland and Hungary.
China represents a more distant benchmark of a poor, rural nation that has followed policies of
“gradualism” in its move towards a market economy.  Only Russia and the Czech Republic followed
policies of speedy, mass privatization.  These data do not provide causality by an application of in-
ductive logic; there are too many sources of causation to make confidently such an inference.  How-
ever, there is little doubt that mass privatization has not created sustained levels of high economic
growth and that the development of capital markets has also disappointed expectations.
We present below an analysis of mass privatization that takes into account micro-level con-
tradictions in the policies to create markets.  In this regard, we propose that the presumption of the3
governance advantages of private ownership was, above all, faulty in its own logic. The dynamics of
financial market creation ride upon the success to re-constitute institutions that support impersonal
trust among market participants. Yet, the fragility of the formation of markets is susceptible to erosion
of trust in their operations if entrepreneurship should abuse the public good of institutions.
This paradox of the desirability of entrepreneurial ambition to propel economic reforms in
light of the danger of abusive erosion of nascent institutions is a conundrum common to many transi-
tion and emerging countries.  The conditions of radical economic change generate unusual opportuni-
ties for highly motivated individuals to profit from these circumstances.  However, in the absence of
established institutions, the economic incentive for many of these actors is not to develop the long-
term market institutions that foster economic development.  Instead, self-interested behavior leads to
short-term manipulations of emerging markets that results in growing distrust of market exchange.  In
effect, the outcomes of mass privatization in both these countries confirm Polanyi’s (1957) injunction
that markets do not create institutions so much as institutions create markets.
There is a complementary set of macro-level factors for the failure of institution creation that
concerns the entanglement of the politics of state power and powerful interests.  As made powerfully
clear by the work of Nee (1989), Stark (1996), McDermott (1998), and Murrell (1995), the collapse
of socialism did not present a tabula rasa to policy makers.  Rather, these firms consisted of distinc-
tive internal and inert resources (e.g. workers, technologies).  As importantly, these firms participated
in industrial networks inherited from the previous regime.  In Starks’ (1996) powerful phrasing, trans-
formation does not begin from but with the existing ruins of socialism.
The institutional analysis of the failure to build deep capital markets in the Czech Republic
and Russia seizes both horns of a recent debate regarding the primacy of cognitive premises and po-
litical actors. (See the useful discussion in DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, and Scott, 1995, as well as
Hirsch, 1998.)  Neither approach alone, in our analysis, is sufficient to explain the failure of the mass
privatization programs.  The new institutionalists have set Hegel back on his feet by emphasizing
ideas and cognition as the bulwark of institutions.  The primacy of taken-for-granted beliefs by indi-4
viduals has caused a rejoinder from institutionalists that politics and agency are active influences on
the formation and maintenance of institutions (DiMaggio, 1988; Hirsch and Lounsboury, 1997).  In-
stitutions are the historical covenants between politicized interests that are bound in coalitional col-
lective action.  It is this coalitional foundation that is not only the heart of Selznick’s (1966) story of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, it is also at the center of Carruther’s (1996) account of the develop-
ment of capital markets in England.
The history of market and institutional formation in transition economies is inexplicable
without reference to the roles of both beliefs and political agency.  Capital market formation rests
critically upon the creation of trust in market transactions.  This trust is supported by the adoption of
what we call “institutional technologies” that are the basic and mundane foundations of formal capital
markets.  Yet, these technologies are not sufficient to generate “chains of trust” which ground the
willingness of individuals to lend and borrow through market brokers and financial markets.  Funda-
mental to the generation of this chain is the political coalition among powerful entrepreneurs to view
transparent market transactions in their interests.  These coalitions did not form in Russia and the
Czech Republic, because it was not in their economic or political interests to support capital markets.
Ownership of assets could be gained by other means.
We demonstrate the necessity to grab both horns of this institutional debate by examining the
development of capital markets through a comparative case-method approach.  We choose to examine
Russia and the Czech Republic because of the similarity in their voucher mass privatization plans in
relying upon the power of the market itself to drive economic development.  Our research design is
oriented toward the examination of the process by which impersonal capital markets become institu-
tionalized as an accepted system of allocation following voucher mass privatization.
To provide clarity, we present first the background of economic reforms before turning to an
institutional analysis of the attempt to establish capital markets in Russia and the Czech Republic
through privatization policies.  In this analysis, we pay special attention to the micro-institutional
factors (i.e. institutional technologies) that support a chain of trust that links buyers and sellers5
through impersonal exchange in financial markets.  In the last section, we migrate from the level of
markets to that of politics and the state to widen the perspective on why markets cannot be created in
the absence of institutions and political guarantees.  The conclusions of the paper argue for a set of
normative conclusions in sharp contradiction to the economic policies of mass privatization adopted
in these two countries.
Mass Privatization Policy
The development of capital markets has long been seen as a fundamental element for the
growth of capitalist economies.  The traditional view in the literature on economic development is
that these markets act as intermediaries between the decision of a person to save and the decision of
an entrepreneur to invest and as vehicles for the efficient allocation and diversification of risk.  Mod-
ern financial economics has augmented this view by emphasizing the critical role played by capital
markets for the provision of appropriate incentives for managers.  Because investors desire the maxi-
mum return on their investment, they will actively monitor managers to insure that they are acting in
the interests of shareholders.  The provision of capital, the transformation of risk, and the monitoring
of managers are the triple roles played by capital markets.
  It is not surprising then that the immediate policy debate following the collapse of socialism
focused on the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the creation of capital market incentives
for managers.  Two primary camps of thought, both emphasizing the creation of capital markets,
marked this early debate.  The first camp stressed that privatization posed primarily a problem of cor-
porate governance.  This approach engaged the critical issues of whether privatization should consist
of the simple distribution of shares to the population, or should also entail the creation of mutual
funds that could more effectively act as monitors.  By and large the eventual consensus, perhaps best
represented in Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), was that private ownership without capital market
corporate governance would be disastrous.
  A second camp argued that privatization was above all a “depoliticization” of the economy.
This camp, whose view is best expressed in Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995), concluded that the6
primacy of removing control from the state dictated a need to provide incentives for interested
stakeholders (e.g. managers and workers) to support privatization by giving them considerable shares
in the newly-created private companies.  The role of capital markets was less transparent, but still
critical to the reasoning of the second camp.  For through the creation of a secondary capital market
for the trading of shares, managers and workers would be motivated to sell their holdings for reasons
of consumption or for diversification.  In addition, firms themselves would need to issue new equity
to finance investment.  Moreover, since outside investors (exclusive of the state) would hold a con-
siderable minority positions, they would in any event be interested monitors through their board rep-
resentation or shareholder meetings.
   These two views strongly influenced the design of the privatization schemes in central and
eastern Europe.  Whereas Poland largely followed the prescriptions of the corporate governance
model, the Czech Republic implicitly and Russia explicitly adopted a radical program to depoliticize
ownership through a policy of mass privatization.  Mass privatization consisted of the distribution of
vouchers or points to the population who then could bid for the shares of state-owned enterprise.1
Given the need for speed and scope of the privatization efforts, and the lack of financial resources on
part of the population, western advisors argued that the free distribution of vouchers was a speedy,
feasible and equitable method by which to undertake privatization (World Bank, 1996).
The Czech and Russian mass privatization programs are similar in their use of mass capital
markets to assign property rights in former state owned enterprises.  As figure 2 illustrates, 41 million
shareholders, 16, 642 joint stock companies, and 596 investment funds were privatized in Russia in a
period of less than two years.  In the Czech Republic, 8.5 million shareholders, 1, 849 joint stock
companies, and 550 investment funds were privatized in less than four years.  The scale and scope of
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interviews.  Students are given a certain number of “points” which they can bid in differing degrees for certain desired spots.
Final allocation is based on market-clearing outcomes based on the total number of  “points” bid.7
these privatization programs make them one of the greatest examples of the non-violent transfer of
property relations in the modern world.
The Czech and Russian cases differed in a few critical aspects.  Created prior to the Russian
experiment, the Czech Republic program used a point system instead of vouchers.2  Large-scale pri-
vatization consisted of two waves held during 1992 to 1994.  Citizens could buy vouchers for prices
representing about 25% of their monthly income.  The bidding for shares was conducted through an
electronic trading system, with terminals located throughout the country.  Through several iterations,
prices were adjusted with ad hoc intervention to clear the market.
The Czech authorities anticipated from the start the creation of investment funds and pro-
vided mild regulation, including restrictions on ownership of a company not to exceed 20% by any
fund and also for the depository of shares operated by a bank. (A depository is required in order to
receive dividends, pay transaction fees, etc.)  Unlike Russia, the dominant Czech banks remained
state-owned throughout the process.  Their role as the primary source of capital gave them a more
central role than banks in other central European countries; Czech firms had the highest debt/equity
ratios in the region (McDermott, 1998).  The state-owned banks own the largest funds, with a few
prominent exceptions.  In addition, the state is estimated to hold, on average, 28% of the equity in the
privatized firms.
The growth of the investment funds, however, was not anticipated.  Through their efforts and
advertising, they increased dramatically the popular acceptance of the program.  Though vouchers
could not be traded on secondary markets, funds could purchase vouchers in exchange for shares in
the funds; most funds were closed-end (meaning that they could be redeemed at their traded price, not
their net asset value).  The popularity of these funds can be seen in figure 2, where it is shown that
they collected an estimated 68% of the points across the two waves of privatization.  These data un-
derstate the high degree of concentration held by the largest funds; estimates show that the top nine8
investment firms held over 48% of the voucher funds, and six of these funds are held by state-owned
financial institutions (Stark and Bruszt, 1998: 277).  Since these funds also own shares in the spon-
soring bank and other banks, the financial interests of the banks and enterprises are tightly intertwined
(Coffee, 1996).
In Russia, enterprises voluntarily nominated themselves for privatization, first by becoming
corporatized through the transfer of their ownership to the State Property Fund that was headed by
Anatoly Chubais.  To make this voluntary decision attractive, the program offered three alternatives
to the enterprises, all of which reserved a substantial allocation of shares for management and work-
ers; on average, the state retained also 20% of the shares.  As a consequence, only 29% of the shares
of a company were on average auctioned  (Blasi et. al., 1997).
The Russian program used vouchers that were purchased for a minimal price.  These vouch-
ers were bearer certificates, allowing for their sale to third parties or even their use as currency.
These vouchers become the main medium through which privatization of state enterprises takes place.
Ownership rights to newly privatized firms are assigned through voucher auctions, whereby investors
use privatization vouchers to bid for different companies.  Since there was no electronic trading sys-
tem, actual purchases of shares had to be conducted at the physical site of the company.  Russian
firms were not required to issue certificates.  The new owners’ names are held in registries located in
thousands of locations throughout Russia, and the maintenance of these registries is the responsibility
of the issuers, not stockholders.
Because many Russian citizens sold their vouchers for cash, only 28% of the eligible popula-
tion are shareholders.  During the first year of privatization, Russia passed legislation to permit the
creation of investment funds.  These funds, created as open joint stock companies, purchased vouch-
ers from citizens in exchange for their shares.  Voucher investment funds collected over 30 million
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countries.  Our analysis is restricted to the Czech Republic. Excellent studies of the privatization process and the subsequent
implications for corporate governance are Coffee (1996, 1998) and McDermott (1998).9
privatization vouchers, or 23% of the 150 million vouchers distributed to Russians.  At the end of pri-
vatization in July 1994, 596 voucher funds existed.
Thus, a major difference between the two country cases is the high ownership of shares by
the Czech investment funds, many of which are controlled by the banks.  In Russia, the high inside
ownership and the active secondary market for vouchers allowed for the investment privatization
funds to play a less important role in the post-privatization ownership structure than in the Czech Re-
public.
Natural and Institutionalized Markets
Public accounts of the economic reasoning behind mass privatization policies in Russia and
the Czech Republic focus on the role of private incentives and market exchange to drive the process
of economic development.  A leading policy adviser to the Russian government, Anders Aslund
(1995), concluded that the fruits of markets reform and privatization were so immediate that Russia
succeeded in creating a “market economy” by 1995, only 3 years after the start of the privatization
program.  Other advisors posit that it was the “belief in the preeminence of economic motives” as
embodied in a theory of “the Russian individual as homo economicus” that led Russian market re-
formers to implement their massive mass privatization program  (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995:
9, 49).  The power of the market was similarly cited to justify the program in the Czech Republic.
When asked about who will speculate on the stock exchange, Thomas Jezek, Czech Ministry of Pri-
vatization, said: “It’s sure that there is dirty money here, but the best method for cleaning the money
is to let them invest it.” (NYT, Jan. 27, 1991, p.103, quoted in Stark and Bruszt 1998, p.153 footnote).
These legitimating accounts of mass privatization are closely linked to a view of markets as
natural phenomena that exist outside the social organization of the broader society.  The intellectual
roots of such an argument are described in Hirschman’s (1977) analysis of the changing role of the
concept of self-interest in explanations of social and economic institutions.  At first, the political
economy approach to self-interest focused on the inimical consequences of self-interest on socially-
beneficial goals, as conflicting desires led to a Hobbsian war of one against all.  However, over time10
the concept of self-interest became tied to a broader conception of an invisible hand of a market that
naturally mediated individual interests to reach collective goals.  As seen from this latter, natural
market perspective, the singular challenge of mass privatization was to remove the state from control
over economic affairs, allowing the forces of individual entrepreneurship to restructure former state
enterprises with little or no state interference.  The invisible hand of the market would itself drive
post-privatization economic development.
In practice, the naïve view of “natural markets” put forth in some accounts of mass privatiza-
tion policy was qualified by a subtle understanding that markets require themselves an institutional
infrastructure (e.g., see Pohl, Jedrzejczak and Anderson, 1995; Morgenstern, 1995; Goldstein and
Gultekin, 1998).  An initial understanding of the institutional foundations of markets begins with the
dominant approach in the new institutional economics that recognizes institutional qualifications to
the natural market hypothesis.  Institutions act as “rules of the game” that define and order the
broader action of the players who compete under these rules (North, 1990).  These broader institu-
tions help to overcome the inherent problems of exchange in markets characterized by imperfect in-
formation and individual opportunism.
However, many approaches in institutional economics maintain the idea of a “natural” market
as an idealized point of comparison.  In less historically sensitive accounts, the theoretical question
starts with the assumption that the “market” is an initial state of nature troubled by transactional fric-
tions.  Institutions that define, monitor and enforce the property rights of organizations are the resolu-
tion to these frictions.  Contextual factors influence the transaction costs to market exchanges, or in
Williamson’s (1991) phrasing, they act as “shift parameters.”  Yet, the market itself is theorized to be
arena that drives the emergence of institutions to resolve hazards of exchange.
The new institutional perspective, in the sense defined by Powell and DiMaggio (1991) and
Scott (1995), starts with beliefs and actions situated in an existing political and social context.  In-
stead of assuming “markets” as an ideal-type model existing outside of existing social relations, this
approach examines markets as institutions that are fully embedded in a broader social environment.11
Capital markets, often thought of as highly transactional in character, rely upon social networks and
norms for their successful operation.  Baker (1984) identifies the close personal ties that link groups
of traders together into identifiable cliques through an analysis of the trading patterns of brokers on a
national securities market.  In a series of ethnographic studies in the stock, bond and futures markets
on Wall Street, Abolafia (1996) clearly demonstrates that actors who buy and sell in these markets are
guided by numerous informal norms.  Market exchanges developed routinized practices that allow for
traders to engage in complex exchange based on verbal agreements and standardized contracts.
Zelizer’s (1978) study on the requirement for the cultural interpretation of death to change in order to
support a market for life insurance similarly demonstrates the interconnections between market and
beliefs.  Markets do not spontaneously arise out a state of nature, but are closely linked to the social
and political processes inherent in a particular time and place.
The breakdown of socialism was not simply a change of economic regime, but a radical
shock to the reservoir of trust that people employed in their everyday lives. In this environment, in-
stitutional trust -- to use Zucker’s (1986) useful distinction-- quickly erodes, leaving an increased use
of personal (or process-based) trust built on the basis of established relationships.  Shapiro (1987:
630) makes a similar observation in her analysis of impersonal trust, noting that in the breakdown of
institutions, individuals may prefer to “keep their money in mattresses, literally and figuratively—
fearful of future transactions and cautious about transforming their tangible property into a symbolic
share of collectivized wealth.”
In this regard, it is fundamental to our analysis to recognize that an important dilemma in
mass privatization policies was the absence in both Russia and the Czech Republic of a previous his-
tory in impersonal exchange through financial markets.  The potential to build upon the existing ruins
of socialism did not exist for the new markets.  As a result, the creation of financial markets was a
radically different problem than privatization and restructuring.  Though the socialist economies de-
veloped extensive bank and enterprise ties, they had no markets, or institutional experiences, for the
issuing and trading of certificates of ownership, namely, stocks.  Yet, it was the development of such12
markets that was critical to the success of the policies of mass privatization.
The collapse of socialism was marked not only by the lack of knowledge regarding capital
markets, but also by the structural disruption and opportunities posed by rapid social change.  These
structural opportunities, as Hirsch and Lounsboury (1997) emphasize in drawing attention to power
and agency for understanding institutions, quickly lead to new aggregations of interest and power in
these countries.  Thus, the moment of ripening beliefs about the behavior of capital markets coincided
with the emergence of powerful interests.
The “transition” from socialism to capitalism represents, then, an unusual experiment that
lays bare the relationship of beliefs to the emergent social and political context.  The policy of mass
privatization presents the problem of the logical necessity of formal assignment and transaction of
property rights in an institutional environment with little history of financial market exchange.  In
comparison with established economies, two factors were lacking in the market environment in Rus-
sia and the Czech Republic: effective state powers to enforce basic laws and regulations, and a market
infrastructure to intermediate between buyers and sellers.
State powers:
The absence of state powers to regulate and control newly created market forces is inherent in
speedy, mass privatization policy.  The decentralization of an economy in a period of few years gives
little time to develop new governmental mechanisms to regulate the new market system.  The thesis
of the strong state is problematic for the natural market view, especially for proponents who viewed
privatization as an act of “depoliticization.”
Not surprisingly, then, institutional economics has emphasized the rule of law over the inter-
vention of the state, while the new institutionalism of sociology emphasizes the ancillary role played
by social networks.3  An example pertinent to financial markets is the North and Weingast (1989)
argument that capital markets for public debt developed only when governments could credibly
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commit to honor their obligations, that is, submit themselves to the rule of law.  The institutional ri-
poste to this study is Carruthers’ (1996) analysis that cites evidence pointing to the role of social net-
works and political affiliation rather than credible commitment to law.  It is this role of social net-
works that Stark and Bruszt (1998) argue is essential to the analysis of socialist transformation.
The states of the former socialist countries entered transition vastly weakened; the policies of
privatization reduced their power at the very moment of the creation of nascent capital markets.  Ex-
actly because of the absence of a strong state, the rule of law cannot be assumed to be effective in
post-privatization period, and, in fact, is itself prey to the political interests of competing groups.  In
any period of transformation, the profit resulting from private information can be considerable, not
only for purposes of trading, but also for the acquisition and ownership of assets.  Because of these
political gains, entrepreneurial individuals are under massive incentives to organize political action
that supports a favorable regulatory regime.  Clearly, one can not assume that powerful interests pre-
fer transparent capital markets.  However, there is little capability of the state to act as an independ-
ent, countervailing force over the emerging interests developed through market reform policy.
Institutional Technology:
 If government is not strong enough to create and enforce law, an important question in these
societies is whether market participants themselves can construct self-regulating mechanisms to sup-
port market-enhancing rules and regulations.4  Markets consist of numerous extra-statal technologies
that enable self-regulating markets.  The core of the qualified natural market thesis is the “endoge-
nous” resolution to the threats posed by informational hazards to formation of capital markets through
the implementation of institutions to provide transparency, monitoring, and enforcement.
For instance, financial markets consist of mechanisms, that we labeled above “institutional
technologies”, that strengthen property rights, provide verifiable information on prices, and monitor
and enforce in order to produce institutional trust.  This technology includes the registries that record
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“constitutional”  influences on the incentives for self-regulation.14
ownership claims to shares, the depositories that permit the clearance and settlement of shares, the
broker/dealer licensing that restricts entry to individuals who meet certain financial and fiduciary
standards, and the stock market regulation that establishes criteria for the creation of such markets as
well as for the requirements to list a company’s shares.  The so-called “technical assistance” by inter-
national organizations such as the World Bank, AID, British Knowhow Fund, or EBRD, is often the
transfer of these institutional technologies to emerging and transition economies.
In Russia and the Czech Republic, none of this market infrastructure existed prior to mass
privatization.  However, mass privatization policy demands that these infrastructural elements be
formed in an extremely rapid manner, as a functional capital market is a pre-requisite for free-market
mass privatization policy.  Brokers, dealers, investment funds, stock markets, registries and deposito-
ries were all necessary components of Russia and the Czech Republic’s privatization programs.
However, whether the organizations designed to operate with vouchers can transform into viable fi-
nancial entities in the post-privatization environment was an untested component of mass privatiza-
tion policy.
The chains of trust:
The essence of economic exchange in western capital markets is the trust that individual in-
vestors have that they will receive a future fair return.  Intermediation, as one of the key functions
played by financial markets, operates on the principle that savers postpone their consumption by
trusting their money for investment by others.  This institutional trust is based on a confidence in the
workings of a complex institutional environment designed to minimize the opportunities for fraud and
theft in complex economic exchange.   The state and the institutional technology play an important
role in developing the regulatory framework to protect fair rules of the game.  The state cannot, how-
ever, dictate trust, nor can the transfer of institutional technology itself assuage a wary public.  States
may define standards of normative and legal behavior, and institutional technologies may provide a
basic blueprint of regulatory oversight.  Yet, nevertheless, the foundation of voluntary market ex-15
change rests ultimately on the individual beliefs of investors that the broader institutional system
works in practice to protect their investments.
From this perspective, the introduction of financial markets in Russia and the Czech Republic
was hampered not only by the absence of regulatory and intermediary organizations, but also by the
fragility of expectations held by market participants due to the disruption in socially-grounded knowl-
edge.  The millions of new shareholders had little idea of how to evaluate and monitor the activities of
the companies or funds that controlled the property rights that they had received in the privatization
process.  The emergence of a new set of beliefs and expectations about market operations and func-
tions therefore was endogenous to the process of capital market formation.  The initial experiences of
market exchange as defined through the mass privatization process provide a powerful template upon
which initial beliefs are formed.
To understand the systemic linkage between the factors described above, consider first the
representative beliefs in a socialist economy before the transformation.  Almost all studies of the so-
cialist economies point to the myth of a centrally planned economy.  Rather, these economies were
characterized by bargaining, whether in the setting of targets, in the provision of supplies to down-
stream firms, or in the agreement struck between workers and managers.  In Kornai’s (1980) influen-
tial analysis, these were supply-constrained economies characterized by chronic shortages.  As a con-
sequence, black markets were a critical element to the socialist period, and daily experience in the
bartering over luxury and necessity goods was a taken-for-granted behavior (Ledeneva 1998; Stark
1989).  It simply is not true that socialism lacked experience in the most basic of market transactions,
namely, barter.  The early prediction by Burawoy and Krotov (1992) that the transformation would
move toward merchant capitalism was based on the recognition of these initial conditions.
In the context of firm relations, these bargaining relationships were encapsulated in partly
formalized, partly informalized entities.  Most of the advanced socialist countries during the 1970s
attempted to resolve the bargaining impasses by giving authority to central enterprises responsible for
associated supplier firms.  The findings of Stark (1996) and McDermott (1998) indicate that enter-16
prise ties in Hungary and the Czech Republic are a recreation of the institutionalized patterns of be-
havior during the socialist era.
However, a key difference between the socialist and capitalist economies --apart from the
powerful role played by competition-- is the relative importance of impersonal exchange in financial
markets.  As Granovetter (1985) has remarked in general and Baker (1984) has observed even for
most transaction-oriented settings of capital markets, economic behavior is couched in a nexus of so-
cial relations.  Yet, the prevalent perception of participants outside the inner trading market is of a
transaction marked by an impersonal exchange, for the identity of the buyer or seller is unknown to
each other.  Impersonal transaction is viable because the institutionalized anticipation is that behavior
is relatively predictable and that means-ends relationships are understood.  These taken-for-granted
anticipations of the wider market participants are the foundation of the willingness to use credit cards,
to allow liens to establish credit in mortgage markets, and to purchase items by phone or internet.
In this wider perspective, financial market formation consists of the creation of a trading
community regulated by both formal and informal mechanisms.  Participants engage in a series of
transactions enacted through a chain of trust.  This chain of trust consists of the links that extend from
the buyer of a security, to the intermediation by agents and other intermediaries that enact the trans-
action, to the seller; and vice versa.  External to this community are market participants who accredit
impersonal trust to a financial market that rides, ironically, upon the quality of personal trust among
traders, brokers, and financial entities.  Financial markets are more than “intermediaries,” as classi-
cally described by economic treatments, between savers and ultimately investors in physical capital.
They are arenas in which trust is so routinized that verbal agreements are held to be binding.
To White (1981), markets are “role systems” characterized by competition among players
following consistent strategies within a defined social community.  It is because markets are role
systems that it is theoretically impossible to separate out economic actions and expectations from the
social groupings in society.  For this reason, the historical absence of financial markets in socialist
economies is a fundamental starting point for the analysis of the formation of new social, as well as17
economic, organization.  Given this absence of existing market institutions, the attempts to create im-
personal financial markets were always subject to competing institutional solutions based upon the
historically existing relations in these societies and upon the new opportunities opened up by the col-
lapse of the socialist regime.  In this sense, the political efforts to establish financial markets and the
strategies by powerful social interests represent, in Fligstein’s (1990, 1996) phrasing, competing con-
ceptions of market control.
In the analysis below, we focus on the relationship among immediate market participants to
generate the institutions required for institutionalized trust among investors.  The provision of institu-
tional technology is critical to the micro-foundations of trust and institutions, but the efficacy of these
instruments is strongly impaired by the loss of credibility that should be infused in the market through
government rule-setting and dominant market participants.  This tension between competing concep-
tions of control  (i.e. natural versus regulated market models) expressed the stalemate among interests
competing for ownership of privatized assets.  Without embedded action or legitimate government
regulation, capital markets were a curious sideshow to the wider efforts to repossess the assets of the
former socialist state by powerful private interests.
Research Design
Our research design is a qualitative data methodology based upon Mill’s notion of a method
of agreement (Ragin, 1987).  By method of agreement-- a standard methodology in comparative re-
search-- we wish to demonstrate that two countries sharing similar initial conditions, Russia and the
Czech Republic, underwent a similar “treatment” called mass privatization and experienced a similar
result, namely, fatal impediments to capital market formation.  Method of agreement cannot establish
causality, but it can reject causal claims.
Our argument is, clearly, not only inferential.  We posit, deductively, that the reform policies
were inherently flawed because privatization created intense pressure for assets to be transacted, and
yet there were no institutional mechanisms by which to effect these transactions.  The detailed history
that we provide seeks to establish that the transfer of institutional technologies took place and still18
markets did not form due to the failure of state regulation and of political interests to support these
developments.  Our use of interviews accords with Burawoy (1991: 272-3) who has called the “inter-
pretative case method” where “macro and micro, general and particular, are collapsed... The micro is
viewed as an expression of the macro, the particular an expression of the general.”  In the sense that
these conclusions suggest normative statements, we are also joining organizational and institution
theory to the debate on mass privatization policies that have been dominated by economic analysis.
The data for this study are mainly derived from interviews in Russia and the Czech
Republic held intermittently during the period of 1994 to 1997. (See the appendix.)  The in-
terviews were conducted with government officials, investment and commercial bankers, in-
vestment fund managers, multinational corporate managers, members of self-regulatory
capital market groups, World Bank officials, and academic policy advisers.  In Russia, over
150 interviews were conducted as part of a larger research project into post-privatization out-
comes in this country, of which 21 were conducted in September 1997 with primarily regu-
latory agents in government and self-organizing associations.  (Earlier interviews are reported
in Kogut 1996; Pistor and Spicer 1997; Spicer 1998).  Seventeen interviews were conducted
with investment bankers, regulatory and government officials, and privatization experts in the
Czech Republic during field research in the summer of 1997.  Interviews were conducted in
Russian, English, Czech, and German, with translators present when needed.  An additional
nine interviews were held with World Bank officials in November 1997. (See the appendix
that summarizes the affiliation of the primary interviewees.)  Primary and secondary material
was used to confirm and supplement the interview data whenever possible.  The narrative of
the events in the paper describes the outcomes of capital market formation in these countries
up to the end of 1997.
Capital Market Formation in Russia, 1992-199719
The 1993 Investment Company Law in Russia defined the basic legal foundation for the for-
mation of capital markets in Russia.  By law, voucher investment funds were allowed to attract
vouchers and cash from the population to create a closed-end mutual fund portfolio.  In contrast, in-
vestment companies were not allowed to attract investment from the population.  However, they were
allowed to buy and sell vouchers and securities on their own accounts and on the account of clients.
Financial brokers were allowed to buy and sell vouchers and securities on the stock exchange and
investment consultants were allowed to underwrite the issuance of new stocks and to provide finan-
cial advice to companies.  By the end of 1993, just over one year into the mass privatization, over 600
investment funds, 300 investment companies, and 900 brokers and investment consultants had re-
ceived formal licenses to compete on the newly created financial markets (The Securities Market in
Russia, No.18, Sept.3, 1996).
Despite the clear distinctions in law, the formal boundaries separating different types of fi-
nancial organizational forms were not followed in actual practice.  The government estimates that up
to 2,000 "unlicensed" financial companies operated on the financial markets during mass privatiza-
tion.  An "unlicensed" company is (a) a financial company that undertakes activities outside its legal
scope, or (b) a company that operates on the market without any type of government license.  A fi-
nancial company engages in activity outside its legal scope if it undertakes activities that are not in-
cluded in the rules that define the organizational form of which it is a member.  For instance, an in-
vestment company might offer bank deposits even though it has no license to act as a bank.  The gov-
ernment estimates that by the end of 1994, over 80 million Russians had invested from 50-70 trillion
rubles ($5-7 billion) in these financial concerns (Federal Commission for the Securities Market
1996a).
Three reasons explain the massive influx of unlicensed financial intermediaries into the mar-
ket during this period.  First, a number of opportunities for speculation, arbitrage and trade existed.
Mass privatization took place during a period of monetary reform and high inflation.  Entrepreneurial
financial companies benefited from the uncertainty of the environment in a number of ways.  Specu-20
lation on the secondary voucher and foreign exchange markets allowed the opportunity for risky,
high-return investments.  Similarly, differences in exchange rates and prices across the many regions
of Russia could be exploited for great gain.  In addition, opportunities in trade, imports, and real es-
tate also existed for companies that had access to capital.  In Russia, many banks grew dramatically
during this time of gross differentials in money markets.
Second, the lack of regulatory oversight allowed financial agents to participate in the market
virtually at will.  It was commonly observed in the interviews that during this period of capital market
formation, the population tended to view stock in similar terms to that of debt.  One public World
Bank document noted that the “general public does not yet seem attracted to trading gains.  Most ac-
tivity reflects a ‘bond’ mentality driven by the issuers’ promises of exceptionally high current payout
(often plus a lottery-type premium) rather than an ‘equity’ mentality that looks to price appreciation”
(Morgenstern, 1995:93).  The distinction between capital markets, e.g. equity and bonds, or the pric-
ing of risk, was not well understood.
In Russia, the notion of risk was also not well perceived and often used to the advantage of
the financial party.  For instance, one company interviewed was officially registered as an investment
company, which was legally forbidden to accept investments from the population.  Yet the company
found a simple solution to avoid regulatory prosecution for engaging in such behavior: it simply made
two contracts.  It made an oral promise to the customer to return the balance plus percent after a
specified time period, just as if the customer was making a bank deposit.  The customer also signed a
piece of paper, however, saying he had hired the company to buy stocks for him; as an investment
company, the company was legally entitled to buy stocks for individuals, but not to accept direct in-
vestments.  The company then kept the formal contract, and a large number of excess stocks, in case
regulators inspected its activities.  This device was but one of many ways this company, and countless
others, found to circumvent legal regulations. (See St. Giles and Buxton, 1995:50 for a similar exam-
ple.)21
Third, unlicensed financial companies succeeded in attracting money because Russian inves-
tors were inexperienced.  They had no experience with financial investments or inflation during the
Soviet period and were willing to invest significant savings in those companies that offered the high-
est returns -- even if little information was available about what the company intended to do with their
investments.  There was intense competition among financial intermediaries to induce the population
to invest.  Massive advertisement campaigns offered guaranteed returns of several thousand percent
per year in rubles (and hundreds percent returns in dollars).  For instance, the Tibet Company offered
an interest rate of 30% a month in nation-wide commercials in March 1993; this rate would yield a
return of over 2000% a year.  It is estimated that over 600,000 investors from cities throughout Russia
invested up to 3 billion rubles ($3 million) in Tibet.  The President of the Tibet Company disappeared
in the middle of 1995; investors did not recover any of their investment in Tibet.  Most of the indi-
viduals who had invested in the other two thousand Russian financial companies also lost their in-
vestments.
A large number of financial companies also issued “stock certificates,” which stated that a
certificate owner was entitled to buy a legal share of the company.  No mechanism, however, was
created to allow for the exchange of the certificate.  Despite the fact that these “stocks” offered no
ownership rights, they were widely traded on the street, in the metro, as well as in the official stock
markets.  One financial journalist estimated that 95% of the daily trading in securities at the Russian
stock exchanges in 1994 took place in these certificates (Baranov, 1995).  This estimate is especially
striking, given that it was believed that 90% of all trading during this time took place outside of the
100 stock exchanges that populated Russia (Morgenstern, 1995).
An example of this phenomenon can be found in sales of the “stock” MMM, which domi-
nated the financial markets in Russia during this time period.  MMM was not a voucher investment
fund, but a pyramid scheme.  MMM advertised its share prices several days in advance, ensuring that
the price increased twice every week.  It also engaged in a massive advertising effort to convince in-
dividuals to invest; the story of an elderly Russian couple slowly getting richer and richer through its22
investments in MMM dominated television commercials during this time.  Although shares of MMM
were actively traded in a secondary market, the company also created its own network of dealers,
which redeemed and sold shares at advertised prices.  In the six months of its existence, MMM’s
price increased 6,000 percent on Moscow’s stock markets.  It is estimated that 5-10 million Russians
invested in MMM certificates.
By the end of privatization in July 1994, the financial markets in Russia were booming.  The
voucher funds and the banks, as well as the 2,000 unlicensed companies had attracted billions of dol-
lars to the market during the period of privatization.  However, the markets fell as quickly as they
were created, starting with MMM.  In July 1994, the price of MMM fell within two days from a high
of $62 on Russian stock exchanges to a low of 50 cents.  Individuals who had invested in MMM now
found their stock certificates were virtually worthless.
The aftermath of the MMM scandal exemplifies the difficulty that the Russian government
had in controlling fraudulent funds.  The MMM directors were not charged with any breach of the
securities law because the company argued successfully that it had not broken any parts of the Rus-
sian legal code.  MMM had not registered as an investment company, and the legal rules which ap-
plied to such concerns thus did not apply to it.  In short, MMM was not illegal, but non-legal: it ex-
isted outside the current legal code, and could not, or at least would not, be prosecuted under existing
laws.  In fact, MMM continued to sell its certificates even after its spectacular crash.  Although Mav-
rodi, the president of MMM, faced potential charges on tax fraud, he found a unique way to avoid
prosecution: he won a seat in the Russian Duma, where parliamentary deputies were exempt from
criminal charges.5
                                                          
5 For information about MMM, see Izvestiya, Dec. 11, 94, December 18, 1994, Jan, 19, 1995; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 28,
1994 p. 1-2; Chicago Tribune, August 16, 1994.  For information about Tibet, see Komersant-Daily, No.49, March 18 1995 or
Komersant, No. 11, March 29, 1994, p.48.23
Institutional Response
The development of the post-privatization capital market infrastructure is closely related to
the initial experience of frauds in the initial development of capital market development.  A clear ex-
ample is the fate of the voucher investment funds.  In March 1995, the Federal Commission on the
Securities Market, a supervisory body equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Committee in the
US, achieves the status of a cabinet ministry in the Yeltsin government.  In July 1995, a presidential
decree called for the Federal Commission to develop a new investment vehicle, the unit investment
fund.  Unlike the joint-stock company status of the voucher investment, unit funds were not to have
shareholders.  Instead, the relationship with their investors is governed by contractual trust indentures.
Moreover, the unit investment funds were to be much more tightly supervised than the vouch invest-
ment funds.  Regulations for net asset evaluation, information disclosure, depository services, audit
reports, tax payments and portfolio standards were to be introduced before the licensing of manage-
ment companies to run the new unit funds.
  The Russian government hoped that some of the unlicensed financial companies could be
transformed into unit investment funds in an attempt to recover the assets from the largest unlicensed
financial companies.  For instance, initial plans were for the assets of one of the largest of these unli-
censed companies, Russkii Dom Selenga, to be transformed into a unit investment fund so that its
shareholders could recover some of their investment.
A second rationale for the development of unit investment funds was to try to attract invest-
ments into the capital markets among the Russian population.  The Federal Commission argued that
the Russian population’s initial experience in financial markets had led to extremely negative atti-
tudes towards the new capital markets.  Based on the government statistics on household savings, the
Federal Commission estimated that the Russian population held from $20-30 billion hidden in their
mattresses, instead of invested in formal financial assets.  The Commission argued “that as much as
10% of domestic savings -- or some $2-3 billion -- could be drawn into equity investment through
well-regulated, reliable investment funds.” (Federal Commission, 1996b)24
The creation of the unit investment funds effectively meant the end of the voucher investment
funds as a viable vehicle of investment.  As a vice-chairman of the newly created Federal Commis-
sion in Russia put it:
Voucher funds served their function.  Their goal was to create the infrastructure to
pass out the vouchers.  But privatization is now over.  The voucher funds no longer
play an important role.  New functions need to be developed in this stage of devel-
opment.  That new role is going to be played by unit investment funds.
In choosing the unit investment fund as the main investment vehicle in the future, the Federal Com-
mission acknowledges that the voucher investment funds have not succeeded in the goal of develop-
ing a broader capital market in Russia.  They argue that a strongly regulated fund is needed to develop
the broader confidence among the population to invest their savings in these new markets.
The Federal Commission’s intervention into the financial markets has not been limited to the
development of a new type of investment fund.  In 1996 new laws on joint-stock companies and on
the securities market began to more clearly identify the broader legal infrastructure of the market.
New licensing criteria for brokers, dealers, stock markets, registrars, and depositories were all intro-
duced.  In each case, the new rules sharply curtailed the number of participants on the market.
To help remedy enforcement problems of these new laws, the Commission enacted regula-
tions to permit the formation of self-regulating organizations.  In explaining in 1995 his support for
self-regulating organizations in the securities market, Dmitri Vasilyev, the chairman of the Federal
Commission and formerly one of the central policymakers for the privatization program, stated that
his budget included enough funds to hire only 117 employees.  He estimates that 4,000-5,000 bureau-
crats are needed to enforce the regulatory acts that already exist, let alone to produce new regulations.
He thus argues that regulation can only be achieved through self-monitoring, which can occur within
a professional industry organization (Kremlin International News Broadcast, 1995).
The dilemma to creating self-regulatory bodies is the classic collective action problem.
Without formal statutory powers, these self-regulatory bodies rely upon voluntary membership and
fees.  Many registrars, depositories, and brokers choose to free ride, and of course some prefer not to25
join because they do not want to comply with the regulations.  The Commission responded to this
problem by authorizing, subsequent to their formation, only one self-regulatory association.  If ap-
proved by the State, these associations (e.g. for registrars/depositories, broker/dealers or investment
funds) have the power to recommend to the Commission who should be licensed, and hence member-
ship in these associations is for all intents and purposes mandatory.
Another broad intervention into the security markets in Russia has been the careful develop-
ment of a new electronic trading system, the RTS system.  The RTS is managed mainly by the Na-
tional Association of Stock Market Participants (“NAUFOR”), a self-regulatory body that has devel-
oped rules for trading on the RTS.  More liquid stocks (shares of approximately 75 companies) are
traded on RTS-1, and less liquid stocks (approximately 96 companies) on RTS-2.  The RTS accounts
for approximately 65% of all Russian stock market turnover in 1997.  The average daily turnover in
the RTS in the first quarter of 1997 was U.S. $38 million.  Although there are more than 60 licensed
stock exchanges in Russia, exchange based trading is limited.  Outside the approximately 100 stocks
that these exchanges trade, the stocks of the remaining 1000s of privatized firms are not traded on
these exchanges.
Overall, the post-privatization capital market has very little resemblance to the initial market
created during the mass privatization period.  Most of the investment funds, broker/dealers and stock
exchanges that were initially created do not compete in the new market.  New rules and regulatory
structures were developed to tightly control the actions and behaviors of the new market participants.
The main motivation for this new set of rules is to avoid the scandals of the first period in which unli-
censed companies and pyramid schemes dominated the overall market.  The new Federal Commis-
sion says that it is the need to control fraudulent behavior and to develop trust in the overall market
trading which justifies their strong intervention into the capital markets.
However, the actions of the Federal Commission have not gone uncontested.  A resolution of
a conference of nearly 250 voucher investment funds in April 1996 states that the “clear intention of
the politics surrounding the regulation of the securities market is the liquidation of the voucher in-26
vestment funds.”  They blame the new regulations on the intent of the new regulators to push the
voucher investment funds off the financial markets by allowing unit investment funds to enter the
market with little competition.
Similarly, the banks have argued that the new strict power of the Federal Commission curtails
the ability of banks to participate freely in the new security markets.  After a public battle between the
Federal Commission and the Central Bank, a resolution was signed in March 1996 between the Cen-
tral Bank and the Federal Commission, brokered by first deputy Prime Minister, Anatoly Chubais.  In
this agreement, the two regulators agreed that the ultimate power in regulating the new financial mar-
kets resided in the Federal Commission.  It was decided that banks would be able to participate on the
securities market, and the Central Bank would have the power to license banks to operate on the fi-
nancial markets.  However, the Central Bank needed to monitor and enforce the security market
regulations developed by the Federal Commission’s standard.  Therefore, the compromise is that the
banks will be able to compete in the new securities market, but that the Federal Commission will de-
velop the regulations with which the banks must comply.
Capital Market Formation in the Czech Republic, 1992-1997
  By and large, the privatization program in the Czech Republic proceeded with less public
scandals than in the Russian case.  In part, this difference is due to the greater degree of centralized
control over the mass privatization process in the Czech Republic.  Ownership rights of privatized
companies in the Czech Republic were registered in a centralized security center, therefore avoiding
the problems of firm-owned registrars and the emission of unregistered bearer shares as in Russia.
The Czech Republic also forbade secondary trading in vouchers/investment points, therefore de-
creasing the incentives for financial companies who wished to become involved only in short-term
speculative trading to enter the market.  Moreover, Czech voucher auctions took place through an
electronic trading system – the RM System – that in theory allowed for greater transparency in the
privatization process.  The Czech auction has been largely evaluated as generating processes that re-
flected underlying asset values. (See, for example, Hingorani et al, 1997).27
All privatized firms became listed on both the Prague stock exchange and the RM electronic
trading system used in the privatization process immediately following privatization.  The capitaliza-
tion of the listed Czech stock market reached $14 billion in 1995, which far exceeded the market
capitalization in any other post-Soviet economy (Pohl, Jedrzejczak and Anderson, 1995).  However,
despite the potential for capital market development in the post-privatization Czech economy, trans-
parent market exchange of ownership rights has not emerged.  Instead of exchange on either the main
stock exchange or the RM system, most trading has taken place outside formal markets.  The only
record of these trades is the report of ownership changes to the central registrar, the “Security Cen-
ter.”
The volume of security transactions in each of these three different markets – the Prague
Stock Market, the RM electronic trading system, and the Security Center -- in Dec. 1996 is shown in
figure 3.  At the Prague Stock Exchange, in the “unlisted” market, now called the “free” market, little
information disclosure of the issuer is required.  The PSE assumes no obligations about the credibility
or truthfulness of any of the information presented.  The Main and Secondary markets are the “listed”
markets.  For the main market, the following conditions must be met: public offer amounts to CZK
200 million, and a liquidity requirement of CZK 300,000 of an average per day trading value re-
corded in the Central Market for the last 12 months prior to submission of the application.  Issuers are
obliged to provide the Stock Exchange, on a quarterly basis, with all relevant economic information.
By the end of 1996, the market capitalization of the listed market was 443 billion CZK and the free
market 115 billion CZK.
The hope was that the RM electronic trading system would transform itself into a broader
electronic system in the post-privatization economy.  However, only 9% of overall trading took place
on this system.  The Securities Center handled 56% of security transactions even though its primary
function was to maintain a central registry of security owners and the issuers of securities.  The Cen-
ter simply recorded ownership changes when trades were conducted.  No price information about the
trade is required, and only the names of the nominal owners need to be provided to the registry.  One28
of our interviewees referred to it as “a black market.”  And yet the bulk of trades occur outside of the
main stock market at prices that are not transparent.
The lack of external market valuation combined with weak regulatory oversight has led to
massive raiding of the profitable assets of companies -- what the Czechs call “tunneling.”  The most
common type of tunneling is illustrated in figure 4, in which the investment fund insiders or managers
of company A sell their assets to friendly investors at a high discount.  For instance, CS Fondy, origi-
nally a voucher investment fund, was sold three times between Feb. 11 and March 3.  In the last deal,
the fund went to a Russian group calling itself KosMos, which installed a new board of directors.
The funds’ assets were liquidated, creating a cash reserve of 1.3 billion CZK.  The money was then
transferred to two other companies, and finally wired to an account aside the country.  According to
Thomas Berka, who represents a CS Fondy Shareholder association, CS Fondy’s 75,000 shareholders
were left with “shares in a chicken breeder whose shares have no real value.”  Despite some internal
dissent, the Finance Ministry approved the transfer, though public outrage eventually led to the resig-
nation of the Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Rudlovak. (The Central European Economic Review,
May 1997, p.18).
Foreign firms are not by any means immune to losing control over their assets.  The affair of
Creditanstalt, an Austrian bank, is representative.  A Czech investment bank explained:
If a shareholder of a fund has 10% of shares of the fund, you can call for an extraordinary
shareholder meeting.  In many cases there are hundreds of thousands of shareholders, so most
of them will not come.  You can then change the management, and make fraud.  Creditanstalt
had the sixth biggest fund.  They thought they were completely safe, a 20 year contract and
all these things.  This group Motoinvest began to buy them, having 11% they called for an
extraordinary shareholder meeting.  Creditanstaldt’s parent company in Vienna decided that
they had no force to protect themselves, and they sold the fund two months after it was intro-
duced on the London Stock Exchange.  Of course, the fund was destroyed.  Motoinvest made
money.  Creditanstalt made money.  The only people who lost money were the small inves-
tors.  The Creditanstalt fund used to be sold for around 1000 crowns per crown, but after-
wards it was sold for ten or twenty crowns.
A slightly more sophisticated example is transfer of cash to a holding company.  Figure 5 illustrates
this more complicated example.  Two companies borrow from banks and then purchase shares of
each other which are held by a common holding company, at a price that is not revealed.  The holding29
company ends up with cash for relinquishing the shares; the two firms are now highly leveraged.  One
interviewee believed one of his investments was tunneled through this method.  They believed that it
would take years to resolve the matter in court, and it is not even clear whether this action is illegal.
They eventually sold their small stake in the company that was being liquidated to the holding com-
pany.
A similar example can be found in the scandals that plagued Agrobanka, the largest collector
of investment points in the second-wave of privatization.  In late 1997, eleven officers and employees
of Agrobanka were arrested as a result of the alleged embezzlement of shareholder funds from Agro-
banka affiliated IPFs.  A December 1995 battle for control of Agrobanka between Motoinvest and
Investicnia precipitated the crisis.  Investicnia eventually retreated on the condition that Motoinvest
buy a large share in a troubled bank controlled by Investicnia.  After an audit of Agrobanka by Price
Waterhouse in 1996, an administrator for the bank was appointed (Coffee 1998, p. 73).
The lack of transparent market prices combined with a fear of the tunneling of assets has led
to large discounts of the closed-end Czech investment funds.  Most of the Czech funds have turned
out to be scandalously poor investments.  The aggregated discounts of the 15 largest investment funds
ranged between 35-45% of net asset value on the Prague Stock Exchange over the course of 1995 and
1996 (Podpiera, 1996).  While discounts of closed-end funds are not unusual, these discounts are far
above western standards.  Moreover, discounts in investment funds beyond the top fifteen have fallen
to 80% or more.
Investors who have been able to sell their shares have received far below the net asset valua-
tion of the funds.  In fact, it is often the funds themselves that buy back their own shares at a dis-
counted rate from initial buyers, creating an incentive for funds to temporarily decrease the market
value of their shares.  For instance, in 1996 the Harvard Consulting Company, who controlled many
of the largest funds from the privatization process, announced that they were merging their multiple
funds into a single holding company, therefore adding another layer of non-transparency into the al-
ready closely-held company.  The price of some Harvard funds declined 22% in one week, allowing30
the owners of the Harvard Fund to buy back many of their shares at a greatly reduced price.  The new
holding company, Daventree Ltd., is based in Cyprus and is effectively outside the control of the
Czech authorities (Coffee, 1998).  
These cases indicate that a principal concern of the post-privatization era has not been corpo-
rate governance, but the legal transfer of assets from uninformed investors.  Several studies show that
privatized firms have performed better than state-owned ones.  Even if these studies are proved to be
true, they leave unaddressed the question of whether privatization alone created the better perform-
ance, or if the movement of ownership to motivated interests contributed, though at the cost of the
minority investors.  It is also clear that some, at least in the Czech case, believe this transfer is desir-
able, as discussed below.
Institutional Response
The policies of the Czech Republic were constructed around a strong free market orientation
characterized by an unwillingness to regulate ex ante anticipated problems.  The preference is to see
ex post what evolves (Coffee, 1996, 1998).  The initial legislation was designed to obstruct the for-
mation of large financial industrial groups, but did not create regulatory entities, such as an equivalent
to the Securities and Exchange Commission.  The economic philosophy of the administration of
Prime Minister Klaus has been to foster competitive markets with minimal government interference
except for the blockage of concentrated economic power by financial and industrial groups.  In Sep-
tember 1997, one broker described the problem of trying to create self-regulatory bodies in the Czech
Republic.
We cannot have at this point in time a true self-regulatory body.  The government issued over
500 brokerage licenses.  They were issued precisely to make it difficult to establish self-
regulatory discipline.  That would be much easier to establish if you have 30 properly capi-
talized, properly equipped brokers.
Many fault the inadequate institutional oversight in capital markets as a primary reason for
the economic stagnation of the Czech Republic.  In opposition to the minimalist regulatory policy,
opposition parties and many financial investment firms have lobbied for increased government regu-31
lation.  Following the collapse of the Klaus government in the fall of 1997, several important changes
have been made to the regulatory order.
One of the most important changes has been the creation of the Czech Securities Commis-
sion.  However, the power of the Commission is still unclear.6  In addition, the Czech government
recently has required that all closed-end funds trading at a discount greater than 40% be converted
into open-ended funds within one year of the enactment of the regulation.  Open-ended funds trade at
the value of the net asset values, and shares must be redeemed at this value.  There is, therefore, a
strong incentive for investment funds to improve their performance.  At the same time, the govern-
ment further reduced their restrictions on holdings by a fund of a given company from 20% to 10%.
Unlike in Russia, the Czech government remains forcefully in opposition to the formation of financial
industrial groups through investment fund holdings.  However, it remains very unclear how the con-
version from closed-end to open-ended funds shall take place given the illiquidity of trading of most
shares.  In other words, the Czech regulatory philosophy now takes the stance that markets must be
regulated in order for markets to exist.
Some of the funds have been converted from financial joint stock companies into industrial
joint stock companies.  This conversion permits the funds to act as an industrial holding and thus
avoid legislative limits on their holdings, as well as the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the
depository (Mejstrik, 1996: 223).  The expectation is that very few of the funds will remain as portfo-
lio investors.  In effect, the Czech stock market has diminished to a substantially smaller role in the
economy than in the heady days following privatization.
Discussion: Institutional Technology and the Chain of Trust
We began with the claim that the analysis of the failure to develop capital markets in Russia
and the Czech Republic following mass privatization should grab both horns of the institutional de-
bate of initial beliefs and political interests.  In both countries, mass privatization created intense pres-
                                                          
6 The new head of the Commission, Jan Mueller, noted he had an upheld battle: “I know foreigners see us as a den of thieves and
I want to do something about it. But I have negligible power to regulate the market.” (Financial Times, May 12, 1998).32
sures over the control of the newly privatized enterprises.  The combination of illiquid markets and
highly dispersed owners creates an unusual situation for motivated and well-informed investors to
acquire high valued assets.   Yet, the financial markets to facilitate, or to render transparent, the ef-
forts of these entrepreneurs to acquire these assets were created haphazardly in tandem with the pri-
vatization programs.  The entrepreneurial puzzle is how ownership could be acquired from dispersed
owners in the absence of developed capital markets.  Ironically, the entrepreneurial resolution to this
puzzle of separating nominal ownership claims from the disposition of the assets led to substantially
damaging the development of financial markets.  In effect, the public has shares, but the market has
sharks.
The post-privatization history of Russia and the Czech Republic recapitulates the historical
lesson that government participation is critical to the establishment of institutions that support market
exchange.  Markets do not spontaneously spawn but arise out of the creation of institutions that sup-
port the personal trust among direct market participants, and the impersonal trust of the ultimate buy-
ers and sellers in this market.  All modern capital markets in developed capitalist economies consist
of mandatory rules of disclosure, accounting methods, and oversight entities to contribute to the de-
velopment of impersonal market exchange.  Rules establish requirements to register ownership, to
provide for clearing of shares through depositories, and to enforce minimal capital provisions and
other standards on brokers and dealers.  The purpose of these rules is to increase market efficiency
and to ensure fairness by making public information regarding not only prices (an essential require-
ment to efficiency) but also the reputation of market participants.
Attempts to build this institutional technology failed partly for the mundane reason so heavily
emphasized by Olson (1965) and Ostrom (1990), namely, that participants refused to pay dues or
contribute effort to the public good of self-regulation.  Some of the proffered legal suggestions to the
problems in the Czech and Russian capital markets are designed to strengthen the representation of
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minority shareholders on boards.7  These perspectives on self-organization and minority shareholder
protection are too late to prevent the consequences of tunneling of assets.  They miss the observation
that mass privatization itself creates the conditions of a repressed equilibrium that could not be re-
solved through corporate governance pressures on individual firms.  As a consequence, political ac-
tion by powerful interests is highly favored in these settings.  Yet, the powers of the state to counter
the deleterious effects of these interests on capital market formation were lacking.
However, the casualty of these entrepreneurial endeavors has been the formation of imper-
sonal financial markets.  The failure of the state to regulate has its counter reflection in the attempts to
achieve a private ordering through industrial groups.  Much as in the case of the emergence of large
and powerful groups who influenced the development of capital markets in London, Russia has wit-
nessed a close alliance between the formation of financial industrial groups (also known as FIGs) and
the government. Currently, 80 FIGs are legally registered in Russia, representing over 5 million
workers, with another 50 applications still pending (Petkoski, 1998).   As in the development of many
financial markets, the most active financial market in Russia has been for the trading of government
bonds in order to finance the chronic deficits.  These deficits are partly the outcome of the insufficient
powers, or will, of the government to collect taxes, sometimes from the large banks who are the major
purchasers of the bonds.  The fiscal crisis of 1996 lead to a loans-for-shares agreement, in which the
government struck a “Faustian bargain” to accept loans from the banks in return for shares of large
enterprises placed in escrow in case of default.  To a large extent, these efforts at a private ordering of
ownership and financial control is an expression of societal interests at political odds with formal at-
tempts to create impersonal markets.  Not surprisingly, international agencies and some governmental
authorities see the rise of business groups as counter to the efforts to create natural markets. (See Lie-
berman and Veimetra 1996, for a discussion.)
The Czech case is more nuanced.  The Czech government has aggressively curbed the crea-
tion of financial groups by restricting the percentage of shares that can be owned by any financial en-
                                                          
7  See Coffee, 1996, as well as Black et al., 1996, on self-enforcing law.34
tity other than an individual.  The restriction on large group formation has strongly impeded the re-
combination of traditional ties into new entities.  Yet, the reconstitution of industrial networks is an
important feature of the economic landscape.  The conversion of the funds into holding companies
has largely come after the weakness of capital market regulation permitted the transfer of assets to the
hands of relatively few individuals and enterprises.  This experience deeply depressed market partici-
pation and the valuations of the investment funds.  As in Russia, a weak capital market has been
partly compensated through a private ordering.  Many industrial enterprises were converted into
holding companies after 1989, with their constituent members marked by strong contractual ties
among themselves and to other suppliers (Haryri and McDermott, 1998; McDermott, 1998).
The evolution of business groups, even if politically contested, points to the endogenous fea-
tures of transformation that are not simple policy instruments open to the state.  Stark and Bruszt
(1998) argue that the role of an autonomous bureaucracy to establish rules is not sufficient.  Rather,
successful transformation also requires a social nexus by which policies are negotiated and imple-
mented.  The development of capital markets is, by the converse of Stark and Bruszt’s argument,
troubled exactly because there was little prior experience of financial institutions in socialism.  A po-
tential resolution, reinforced by Carruthers’ (1996) history of the birth of capital markets in London,
is the self-organization of decentralized regulation created by powerful interests who profit from the
market, and the willingness of government to establish the legal and regulatory framework to support
and to curtail their ambitions.
The lessons of the two countries reinforce this conclusion by offering the counterfactual: an
impaired government cannot channel the efforts of powerful interests to support financial market
creation.  Developing the chain of trust amidst disappearing assets was a hat trick that could not be
accomplished in either country.  Without impersonal financial markets, the policies of mass privati-
zation had no institutional mechanism by which to perform the task of intermediating in the realloca-
tion of ownership.  The efforts by industrial groups to fill this gap posed a serious challenge to reform
policies.  With inadequate financial markets, privatization policies in both countries created condi-35
tions that weakened the property rights of the new owners.  The reliance on natural market formation
created tragically an erosion of the rule of law and norms.  It is the direction of this causality that ap-
pears entirely to run counter to the standard economic analysis of transition and developing econo-
mies.
Conclusions
It is the dilemma of mass privatization policies that they establish the promise of mass owner-
ship, but ultimately depend upon capital markets to achieve the concentration of shares in the hands
of strategic investors who can effect control.  Since the formation of capital markets themselves rides
upon the efforts of concentrated interests, there is an inherent contradiction in mass privatization poli-
cies: the markets that are required to permit trading among the millions of dispersed owners cannot
form until motivated participants can support the institutions of markets.  It is, however, simply not in
the interest of many of these participants to create transparent markets.
The weakness of capital markets in the Czech Republic and Russia is partly the outcome over
the ambivalence of government intervention in the transition process.  The role of government is
contentious even in highly stable democratic states.  In the context of transformation, the intervention
of the state is strongly resisted by some parties as a reversal to socialism.  In fact, the argument of
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995) that privatization served to “depoliticize” the economy decep-
tively fails to separate state authority from the political agency of interested and motivated parties to
transition policies.
   The easy equation of politics and the state is probably never fully justified and is certainly
open to examination in the context of the highly fluid conditions following the collapse of socialism.
No doubt, a more accurate phrasing of the depoliticization argument is the “debureaucratization” of
the former central planning apparatus, which privatization achieved in the form of transferring owner-
ship from ministries to private hands.8  However, to view the elimination of state ownership as a dec-
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rement in politics is to ignore conceptually the extra-statal influence of political actors in the post-
privatization period.
The pragmatic conclusions from this study are that mass privatization policies are inherently
marred by internal contradictions.  Markets are not created as a logical implication of the elimination
of state control over economic activities.  “Transition” policies are implemented through the institu-
tional construction of new behaviors rooted in a procedural knowledge of what constitutes a market.
The initial experiences of capital market participation did not reinforce subsequent participation for
the vast number of citizens in either country.  As a result, formal financial markets did not emerge to
provide a means by which to enable the informed sale of shares distributed through the privatization
policies.
The analysis of these two cases suggests, however, a more far-reaching issue.  Howard
Becker (1992) argues that case analysis always poses the question “what is this a case of?” as an it-
erative feature of the research.  To a great extent, these comparative cases are about the creation of
the new owners.  In this regard, there is a troubling implication, namely, that the creation of dispersed
owners was never the primary intent of privatization policies in the first place.  Retrospective analy-
ses that stress the remarkable achievements of transferring assets rapidly to the private sector ignore
that privatization policy itself created the conditions for an emergence of an elite ownership class.
In this respect, privatization has been above all a process that determined the new owners in
Russia and the Czech Republic.  Whether the concentration of wealth was unforeseen or even unde-
sired by policy makers is an important historical question.  The corporate governance perspective on
privatization emphasizes that moving ownership to the hands of motivated owners is critical to the
restructuring process.  By this logic, the concentration of ownership into the hands of a few is not
unwanted, even if the means of accumulation were destructive to capital market formation.  What is
clear is that the implications of the privatization experiment for who becomes an owner and who be-
comes a worker was quickly understood by many resourceful entrepreneurs who seized control over
privatized assets by often legal but dubious behaviors detrimental to market formation.  The historical37
event called mass privatization created a unique moment for the identity of an ownership class of the
emergent capitalist societies.  These outcomes of who owns are the most critical legacy left by the
privatization experiences.
The deductions made from the analysis of the Czech and Russian efforts to develop capital
markets are relevant not only for the understanding of theory, but also for the development of appro-
priate policies.  Without an understanding of organizational and institutional theories, policies to aid
socialist transformation are trapped in a developmental lens that ignores the inertia of organizational
resources and the institutional context of social action.  The implicit functionalism of the economic
policies presumed that capital markets would arise in order to serve the financing needs of privatized
companies and to provide a secondary market for the trading of securities.  However, the experiences
in both countries show that politics can be displaced, but not eliminated; that ambiguous ownership
rights can engender unanticipated outcomes; and that market solutions without institutional under-
standings create insurmountable market failures.  The irony of these policies is that a principal lesson
has been that market reforms cannot create viable markets; only institutional formation can.38
Figure 1
Percentage Changes in Official GDP, 1991-1997
Country 1991 1992 1993  1994  1995 1996 1997
China 7.7 12.8  13.4  12.6  10.5 9.7 8.8
Czech
Republic
… -4.1  1.0    5.6  5.0 4.4 1.0
Hungary -6.8 -0.6  1.3    6.1  1.5 0.6 4.4
Poland -7.6 5.3  6.1    8.3  6.5 6.0 6.9
Russia -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.1 -4.9 0.8
Sources:  Data for former Soviet Bloc countries, 1991-1996 is from Goldman (1997).  1997 data is from the
World Bank (1998).  Chinese data is from IMF (1998).39
     Figure 2
       Russian and Czech
Mass Privatization Programs
Russia
(End of Privatization)
Czech Republic
(End of Privatization)
Speed of Mass
Privatization
October 1992-
June 1994
October 1991-March
1995
New Shareholders 41 Million (28% of
population)
8.5 million (80% of
population)
Companies Privatized 16,642 (70-80% of
industrial output)
1,849 (65%-90% of
industrial output)
Investment Privatization
Funds
596 550*
% of Vouchers/Points
Collected by Funds
23% 68%
Sources:  Coffee (1996); Blasi et al (1997); Frydman, Pistor, and Rapaczynski (1996)
*    Of the 550 investment privatization funds, 277 were organized as joint-stock companies and 273 were
organized as unit funds. The data is from May 30, 1995, as reported in Podpiera (1996).40
 Figure 3
Initial Capital Market Outcomes
Czech Republic
 34% of Total Security
Transactions (Dec. 1996)
- Listed Market - 96 Issues
- Unlisted Market - 1,574 Issue
RM-System
 9% of Total Transactions
- Electronic Trading System
 56% of Total Transactions
 - Centralized Registry
- No Price Disclosure
Prague Stock Exchange
Security Center
Source: Prague Stock Exchange (1997); Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic (1997)41
   Figure 4
       Tunneling in the Czech Republic
    Company A  is an empty shell.
    Company B  is owned by  “friendly” company.
COMPANY
A
Investment
Fund
Small
Investors
Sell assets at
high discount
“Friendly
    Investors”
COMPANY
B42
Figure 5
Tunneling Assets in the Czech Republic
Firm A borrows from bank and buys holding company’s shares in
company B.
Firm B then buys holding company’s shares in company A.
End result: Two companies are leveraged, holding company keeps
cash.
HOLDING
COMPANY A COMPANY B
40% 35%43
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Appendix
A) Interviews Conducted in Russia and Czech Republic, August-September 1997
Type of Interviewee          Number of Interviews
        Russia Czech Republic
Government Officials 2 1
Journalists 1 1
Market Exchange Systems* 6 2
Policy Advisors/Consultants 5 5
Private Financial Companies 5 5
(Bankers/brokers/fund managers)
Professional/Industry Associations** 2 3
* In Russia, this includes representatives of the Russian Stock Exchange, Central Russian Stock Ex-
change (TsRYB), and the Russian Electronic Trading System (RTS).  In Prague, this includes repre-
sentatives of the Prague Stock Exchange and the RM Electronic Trading System.
** In Russia, this includes representatives from NAUFOR (National Association of Security Market
Participants) and PATRAD (Professional Association of Registrars, Transfer-Agents and Deposito-
ries).  In the Czech Republic, this includes representatives from the Czech Pulp and Paper Industry
Association, German-Czech industry association, and the Metal Trade Union.
B) Interviews Conducted at the World Bank, Washington, D.C. October, 1997
Nine interviews with World Bank officials closely involved in the formation and implementation of
mass privatization programs in East-Central Europe.